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COLLECTION OF RENTS BY A MORTGAGEE IN
PENNSYLVANIA
HAROLD S. IRWIN*

The recent case of People r-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Henshaw1 brings again to
the fore the problem of the rights and remedies of a mortgagee of realty in Pennsylvania as to collection of rents from the mortgaged property. This situation has
become of increasing importance in recent years as more and more mortgagees
seek to resort to the expedient of collecting rents rather than to foreclose on the
mortgage or to seek judgment on the bond and consequent sale of the realty. When
a forced sale of the realty is likely to produce enough to pay all costs and principal
and interest of the mortgage debt, there is but little incentive to assume the obligations inherent in the collection of rent from the mortgaged premises. When foreclosure or sale on the bond means purchasing of the property by the mortgagee
and a long-term effort to recoup the debt by leasing or sale, with the risk of further
losses inherent in complete ownership thus thrust upon the mortgagee, the alternative of seeking to collect rents from the mortgaged property, either already subject
to leases or capable of being leased at a reasonable return, frequently presents an
attractive choice. It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the rights and remedies
of a mortgagee who makes this latter choice and to suggest several of the duties
assumed by such rent collection.
PRELIMINARY PROBLEMS

A. Is default in payment of the mortgage debt a necessary prerequisite
to collection of rents?
A discussion of the problem of whether or not a default in complying with
the terms of the mortgage obligation is a necessary prerequisite to the effective
assertion of a right to collect rent from the mortgaged property, requires first an
understanding of the mortgage theory in Pennsylvania. It is not our purpose to
discuss in detail the decisions in this state dealing with the question of whether
legal title to the land passes to the mortgagee under a mortgage or whether the
mortgagee gets merely a lien upon the property .This has been done very satisfac*Ph.B., Dickinson College, 1923; M.A., Dickinson College, 1925; LL.B., Dickinson School of
Law, 1925.

Member of faculty of Dickinson School of Law, 1925-

1141 Pa. Super. 585, 15 A(2d) 711 (1940), opinion by Keller, P.J. In this article the
terms "lessoi" and 'lessee" are used without regard to whether the parties are the original contracting parties or their assignees.
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torily by Professor William H. Lloyd in his article, "The Mortgage Theory of
Pennsylvania."'2 Suffice it to say here that most of the cases state that legal title
does pass as between the parties, that it is a conveyance "so far as it is necessary
to enforce it as a security." Hence we find the statement, oft repeated, that since
legal title passes to the mortgagee, he has the right to possession of the mortgaged
property prior to any default by the mortgagor and can enforce this right by ejectment the moment after the mortgage is given. 8 Based on this theory as to the
mortgagee's right to possession prior to default, he could collect rents prior to default on the mortgage obligation. But in recent years the persisting reluctance4 to
carry the legal title theory to this extreme has caused both Supreme and Superior
courts of Pennsylvania to emphasize that in modern practice5 the right is to be exercised only after a default has occurred but neither court has flatly so held. For
example, it is stated in Miners Savings Bank v. Thomas,6 "It is settled in this State
that on default by a mortgagor...." In Randal v. Jersey Investment Co., 7 it was
said that a mortgage may be treated as a conveyance whenever the mortgagee deems
it necessary so to do in order to enable him to speedily and effectively recover the
amount "then due" on the bond. It was also said that the mortgagee could enforce
a clause conveying the rents to him "if the owner is in default."
True, in no one of the recent cases has an attempt been made to assert any
right of possession prior to default and hence the emphasis on default is dicta
merely. While the question is largely an academic one, since assertion of the right
to immediate possession prior to default promises little gain to the mortgagee, yet
the threat of a possible loss of possession although no default has occurred remains
in our law and is rather disquieting. On occasion, the right might be highly beneficial to the mortgagee in a falling realty market, where the mortgagor is allowing
the property to depreciate and is using "his substance in riotous living," making a
later default almost inevitable. But merely because it might be beneficial to a
mortgagee is no sufficient reason why the right should exist contrary to the intent
of the parties to the mortgage relation. It is to be hoped that our courts, if met by
the precise issue, will hold that the intention of the parties to the contract, based
on the modern as well as ancient practice in Pennsylvania not to assert a possessory
right before default, forbids any such right and that a contract giving the right to
possession before default is essential rather than a contract provision to the con2(1924)

73 UNIVERSITY OF PENN'A LAW REVIEW 43.

3See cases cited in Bulger v. Wilderman and Pleet, 101 Pa. Super. 168 (1930); such as
Youngman v. Elmira RR. Co., 65 Pa. 278 (1870); Soper v. Guernsey, 71 Pa. 219 (1872), andt

Tryon4 v. Munson, 77 Pa. 250 (1875).
See Guthrie v. Kahle, 46 Pa. 331 (1864).
SThese words are italicized in the Peoples case, supra, note 1.
6140 Pa. Super. 5, 12 A.(2d) 810 (1940).

Italics added.

7306 Pa. 1, 158 At. 865 (1932), italics added. See also Erny v,Sauer, 234 Pa. 330, 83 Atl.
205 (1912) and Harper v. Consolidated Rubber Co., 284 Pa. 444, 131 At. 356 (1925).
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trary. This would at least cause joy in publishing ranks for mortgage forms would
have to be changed to give this right to the mortgagee. Certainly an asserted right
to collect rents prior to default is inconsistent with the mortgage contract. How
may a mortgagee be permitted to collect rents and appropriate them to a debt that
is not yet due? How can he enforce even partial payment now when by its terms
the debt does not fall due until some time later? We believe it correct to conclude,
therefore, that where the right to collect rents otherwise would exist, such right
cannot be asserted until after a default by virtue of which some part of the debt is
presently due and payable.
B. Of what effect is the presence in the mortgage of a clause including
ffrents" or "appurtenances"?
Many mortgage forms include in that portion of the form dealing with tre
description of the mortgaged -property, a clause reciting that the land is transferred
"together with the rents, issues and profits thereof." Another frequent clause is
one reciting that it is "together with ... privileges, hereditaments and appurtenances" and many, with that conservatism that dates back to the time when the
scrivener was paid so much per word, include both of these clauses. Some forms,
with the economy of words emphasis of more recent years, omit all such clauses.
Are these clauses surplusage? Do they state anything more than the law would
state in their absence? Can a court properly say that the intention of the normal
mortgagor varies with the inclusion or exclusion of one of these clauses? To give
any effect to the presence or absence of one of these clauses would be to make the
law as formalistic as it was in the days of the Normans and is not in keeping with
the tendency of the times as shown by the Short Form of Deed Act, etc.
But do our courts agree with this conclusion? A New Jersey case 8 states with
reference to a "rents, issues and profits" clause, "These words add nothing to the
security of the mortgage debt. They mean nothing more than the law allos; that
is, rents, after default, upon the mortgagee taking possession." That this should
be the conclusion in Pennsylvania since the Act of 19099 seems inescapable. The
courts concede that as between the parties a mortgage is both in form and in effect
a conveyance. This act states:
"All deeds or instruments in writing for conveying or releasing land
hereafter executed, granting or conveying lands, unless an exception
or reservation be made therein, shall be construed to include all the
estate, right, title, interest, property, claim, and demand whatsoever,
SMyers v. Brown, 92 N.J. Eq. 348, 112 At. 844 (1921). See also Freedman's Saving Co v.
Shepherd, 127 U.S. 494 (1887), therein cited.
9April 1, 1909, P.L. 91, Sec. 2, amended by Act of April 30, 1925, P.L. 404, Sec, 2, 21 PS 3.
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of the grantor or grantors, in law, equity or otherwise howsoever, of,
in, and to the same, and every part thereof, together with all and
singular the improvements, ways, waters, water courses, rights, liberties, privileges, hereditaments, and appurtenances whatsoever thereto
belonging, or in anywise appertaining, and the reversions and remainders, rents, issues and profits thereof."
Clearly, then, these combined clauses are inserted by the law into every conveyance
of land unless a reservation or exception requires the contrary. No such reservation or exception appears in the usual mortgage.
But this Act is overlooked in the Randal case 10 and the Supreme Court states
that the conclusion of the New Jersey court cited above that the words are practically meaningless "is not the law of this State." The case does not point out the
precise legal effect produced by the presence of these words that would not have
been produced were the words lacking. The case holds that where a lease is executed after the recording of the mortgage, payment of rent to the mortgagee, after
default by the mortgagor, on demand of the mortgagee, is a good payment and the
mortgagor may not again collect from the lessee. No case in Pennsylvania holds
or intimates that such a clause is necessary to the mortgagee's right to collect rent.
This right is based upon either the assignment of the lessor's reversion to the mortgagee or based upon the mortgagee's right of possession superior to that of a subsequent lessee. The Peoples case 1' also intimates at several points a possible effect
of such a "rents, issues and profits" clause. The suggestion is made with apparent
hesitancy and again no reason is given for the intimation that such a clause produces different legal consequences than where such is lacking. It is devoutly to be
desired that these unsupported insinuations do not acquire the dignity of becoming
part of our law.
LEASE PRIOR TO MORTGAGE

The priority of the lease over the mortgage is to be determined by the principles of the recording system, possession of property as notice of the possessor's
rights therein and the provisions of the Act of 1905.12 The usual situation of this
character is where.a lessee is in possession of the property at the time of execution
of the mortgage. Here, the mortgagee has notice from the fact of possession of
the rights of the lessee and the mortgage is taken subject thereto.
It is vital under the Pennsylvania law to distinguish between the cases of a
lease prior to the mortgage and a lease made after the mortgage has been executed
lOSupra, note 7, at page 6.
llSupra, note 1, at page 592 and 593. Cf. Mertens's Estate, 18 D. & C. 310 (1932)
v. Holland Co., 82 Pitts. L.J. 537 (1934).
Delehanty
2
1 Act of April 20, 1905, P.L. 239, Sec. 14, 12 PS 2585.

and
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and recorded, insofar as collection of rents is concerned. 18 This is true because
the theory underlying the right to collect rents is different in the two situations and
with the difference in underlying theory comes a difference in legal results.
Relatively few problems in regard to rent collection are met where the lease
precedes the mortgage. Since the lessor when he delivers the mortgage has only
a reversion subject to the superior possessory rights of the lessee, this is all that can
be transferred to the mortgagee even under the "legal title as between the parties"
theory used in Pennsylvania. Hence our cases hold that this reversion is transferred
or assigned to the mortgagee. Being the assignee of the lessor's reversion, he ac,quires all the rights and remedies of an assignee of the reversion. The covenant
of the lessee to pay rent is a covenant running with the land and the benefit of such
covenant with the usual remedies for its enforcement passes to the mortgagee. On
default by the mortgagor, the mortgagee as assignee of the reversion may demand
payment of the rent to him, the mortgagee. Should the tenant refuse to so pay,
the mortgagee has the usual remedies of a lessor to enforce payment, including
assumpsit or distress. No consent by the lessee to the assignment, no recognition
of the transfer, no agreement to pay rent to the mortgagee, is required to allow
these remedies. The mortgagee can assert a right to actual possession only if the
lessor-mortgagor could so assert. If there is a provision for reentry and termination of the lease on default in payment of rent, the mortgagee could assert this right
including the right to confess judgment in ejectment or in assumpsit for rent on a
warrant contained in the lease. 14 Payment of the rent to the mortgagor before
notice by the mortgagee to pay to him, even though in advance as per the terms of
the lease, is a good payment. Payment after such notice would not be a good payment and the mortgagee could compel the lessee to make payment to him or require the mortgagor to account for such receipts. 15 The mortgagee, as assignee,
could collect rents accruing after the mortgage was delivered and before demand
was made on the lessee, to the extent that they were unpaid when notice was given
to the lessee, as well as rents accruing thereafter.16 But strangely and erroneously,
Kenwood v. Dordickvl holds that the transferee of the reversion could not collect
-such arrearages of rent by distress. If the mortgaged land is sold on foreclosure
13Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Henshaw, supra, note 1. The failure to note this distinction
must have been the cause of much chagrin to amicus curiae in that case.

154See Youghiogheny-Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Carlet, 92 Pa. Super. 40 (1927).
1 Randal v. Jersey Investment Co., supra, note 7, and Real Estate-L.T. & T. Co. v. Homer
B. &16L. Assoc., 138 Pa. Super. 563, 10 A.(2d) 786 (1939).
1n the Peoples case the already accrued rents that the mortgagee could collect on demand
were not confined to those accruing after the mortgage was delivered. But it is axiomatic that an
assignment of a reversion does not carry with it already accrued rents which are merely choses in
action. See Newbold v. Comfort, 2 Clark (Pa.) 331 (1841) and TIFFANY, LANDLORD AND
TENANT, (2nd Ed. 1910) 572. See also Teal v. Walker, 111 U.S. 242 (1883) frequently cited
with approval by the Pennsylvania courts.
17104 Pa. Super. 12 (1932) relying upon Lewis's Appeal, 66 Pa. 312 (1870) but which
does not so hold.
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by the mortgagee, the purchaser takes subject to the superior rights of the lessee
and would in turn become entitled to the rents after acknowledgment and delivery
of the deed by the sheriff. 18
MORTGAGE PRIOR TO LEASE

The priority of the mortgage over the lease is to be determined by the principles of the recording system, the provisions of the Act of 1905, etc.19 The usual
situation of this character is where the mortgage has been recorded at the time the
mortgagor, who has retained possession, makes the lease. Here the lessee has
notice from the recordation of the mortgage of the rights of the mortgagee and the
lease is taken subject thereto.
It is in this situation that most of the problems have arisen, some of which are
as yet unanswered or answered in an unsatisfactory manner. The cases all agree
that so long as the mortgagor retains possession, even though a default has occurred,
and no demand for possession has been made by the mortgagee, the mortgagor
may retain possession, taking the rents and profits thereof by his own occupancy
or under leases made by him and need not account for these rents and profits to
the mortgagee.20 Leases made by the mortgagor are subject to the superior right
of the mortgagee to assert his right to possession and oust the lessee, after default
by the mortgagor.21 Since the mortgagee's right to possession is superior to that
of the lessee, the lessee cannot prevent his ouster by a tender of rent to the mortgagee. The mortgagee may desire actual possession of the land or may wish to
make a new lease to another at a higher rental. Should possession not be secur22
able by peaceful means, the mortgagee could bring ejectment against the lessee
23
It
and in this action should recover mesne profits from the time of demand.
must be remembered that in this situation, the mortgagee is not the assignee of the
reversion of the lessor since no such reversion existed when the mortgage was executed but arose only subsequently. Hence the mortgagee is not limited to securing
possession only if and when the lessor could so secure it and no default in rent
payment or breach of condition by the lessee is necessary. After securing possession by peaceful means, or by ejectment, the mortgagee could make new leases in
18Act of 1905, supra, note 12, Sec. 13. This act unnecessarily provides for a method whereby
the purchaser can become the assignee of the reversion which he already is without adopting any
such procedure.
note 12 and text.
19Supra,
2
0See Real Estate-L.T. & T. Co. v. Homer B. & L. Assoc., supra, note 15; Miners Savings
Bank v. Thomas, supra, note 6; Randal v. Jersey Investment Co., supra, note 7; Shallcross v.
Rankin, 82 F. (2d) 690 (1936).
21Peoples-Pittsburgh Trust Co. v. Henshaw, supra, note 1, at page 590.
221bid.
2
SFor cases confining the mortgagee to mesne profits during the pendency of the action only,
when action is against the mortgagor, see Polhill v. Brown, 10 S.E. 921 (Ga. 1890) and Stevens v.
McCurdy, 52 S.E. 762 (Ga. 1905).
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his own right and collect the rents thereon, subject of course to the termination of
these leases by termination of the mortgagee's right of possession by payment or
tender of the mortgage debt. Wisdom would dictate that such lessee secure the
joinder of the mortgagor in making the lease. Where made by the mortgagee only,
wisdom would dictate that the mortgagee-lessor protect himself against suit for
breach of covenant on such lease-termination by payment or tender, by insertion
of an appropriate clause, even though such clause may not be necessary.
When demand for payment of rent is made by the mortgagee to the mortgagor's lessee, after default by the mortgagor, he will comply therewith usually,
since he has nothing to lose by conforming to the demand, such being a good payment as against the lessor, and has something to lose by refusing to conform to the
demand, being subject to ouster by ejectment or under the Act of 1905 after foreclosure. But should he refuse to pay the rent to the mortgagee, the latter cannot,
in his own right, sue in assumpsit, distrain or enjoin the lessee from paying the
rent to the lessor. 2' It may be that the mortgagee can secure the rent or its equivalent indirectly by demanding possession from the lessee on his refusal to pay the
rent to the mortgagee, and on the lessee's refusal of possession, sue in ejectment
including a claim for mesne profits therein or suing the lessee directly in trespass.
No case has been found in Pennsylvania deciding the liability of the lessee for
mesne profits in such circumstances but the existing general rules would seem to
permit it.24a
The theory on which the courts refuse to permit assumpsit or distraint in this
situation is that no privity exists between the mortgagee and lessee, either of contract or of estate.25 The Peoples case suggests that a direction by the mortgagorlessor to the mortgagee would permit distraint or assumpsit. 26 No decision on this
point is cited or has been found by us. Such a direction would usually be readily
procurable by the mortgagee since it might avoid foreclosure and payments received would be a credit on the mortgage. Such a direction or authority to collect
might well be supported as an agency authority to the mortgagee. As an agency
power given as additional security for the mrrtgage debt, such an agency should
be irrevocable by the mortgagor-lessor until the debt is paid or tendered.2 7 As an
agency power, a written direction should not be required but if treated as a transfer
of the mortgagor's reversionary rights under the lease, it might require a signed
writing as an interest in land.
24

case.

Peoples case, supra, note 1.

The refusal of the injunction was the specific holding in this

4

2 aTenant liable for mesne profits, Burke v. Willard, 249 Mass. 313, 144 N.E. 223 (1924).
2sPeoples case, supra note 1, at page 591.

261d. at page 591.
27
See section 139, RESTATEMENT
26 Dist. (Pa.) 173 (1916).
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and Bingham v. Secure B. & L. Ass'n,
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If such lessee pays the rent on demand to the mortgagee, the payment is good
against his lessor, the mortgagor. On this point the cases all agree. But if after
paying one or more installments of rent, the lessee should then fail or refuse to
pay further installments, may the mortgagee distrain or sue in assumpsit for such
rent? On this issue the recent cases of Peoples-PittsburghTrust Co. v. Henshaw28
and Brown v. Aiken 29 seem to be in direct and irreconcilable conflict. In the
Peoples case, the court said, speaking of actual payment of rent by the lessee to the
mortgagee on a lease made after the mortgage, ". . . and such payment being
equivalent to an attornment . . . thereafter the mortgagee can enforce the lease by
distraint or action for rent, in the right, however, of the mortgagor...." Following this statement, which is merely dictum, the reason is given for not allowing
distraint or action where the lessee refuses to pay any rent at all to the mortgagee.
The reason given, quoting the case of Teal v. Walker,30 is that no privity of estate
or contract exists and hence he cannot proceed by distress or action. In the Brown
case, also speaking of actual payment of rent by the lessee to the mortgagee on a
lease made after the mortgage, it is said, "The acceptance of rents and profits under
a lease by a mortgagee in possession does not affect or alter the tenant's relationship to the parties. There is neither privity of estate nor privity of contract created
by this act between the tenant and the mortgagee in possession." (Italics added.)
It seems to follow inevitably that the Supreme Court is saying that neither distraint
nor action would be available to the mortgagee since no relationship justifying it
is established by such payment and acceptance of rent. The Superior Court's dictum
is contradictory to the statement in the Brown case. Nor does the statement that
he could sue or distrain "in the right of the mortgagor" justify the dictum since the
Superior Court opinion shows that this means merely that the mortgagee must
account for such rent as a "quasi-trustee."
In the situation where no rent is collected from the lessee by the prior mortgagee, a foreclosure of the mortgage or sale of the property on a judgment secured
on the debt, will result in the purchaser of the property, be he the mortgagee or a
third person, taking free of the inferior lease, if such purchaser chooses to exercise
the option to be free of it. While we are still in a critical mood, we might mention
that the statement in the Peoples case to the effect that the lease is "extinguished"
by such sale is not correct.3 1 If this were true, the purchaser would have no option
to hold the lessee to the lease if it were a favorable one. But he does have such
an option, indubitably8 2 If the purchaser chooses to affirm the lease or renounce
28Supra, note 1. Bulger v. Wilderman and Pleet, supra, note 3, and Girard Trust Co. v.
Dempsey, 129 Pa. Super. 471, 196 Atd. 593 (1938) contain this same dictum.
(,6 ':s Atl. 441 (1938).
3OSupra, note 16.

SSee page 590 of the Peoples case, supra, note 1.
SZBrown v. Aiken, supra, note 29, at page 572; Curry v. Bacharach Quality Shops, 271 Pa.
364, 117 At. 435 (1921). Where the mortgage made prior to the lease is assigned to the mortgagor,
his covenant of quiet enjoyment precludes a right to eject the subsequent lessee, Morris v. Connellan,
25 D. & C. 459 (1935).
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his paramount right to possession, he becomes the assignee of the reversion of the
lessor, with all the rights and remedies thereto appertaining and subject also to his
and delivery of the
liabilities.35 Collection of rents after the acknowledgment
34
sheriff's deed constitutes such affirmance or renouncing.
If rent is collected on such inferior lease before sale, does this act as a new
lease between mortgagee and lessee, or create a new tenancy from year to year or
in any way impede the right of the mortgagee to assert his superior right of possession, either before or after sale of the property on the mortgage? While the temptation to discuss "attornment" or "the equivalent of an attornment," etc., etc., as
discussed in the recent Randal, Brown and Peoples cases, is well-nigh irresistible,
limits of space as well as the dictates of prudence compel us to omit such discussion.
The answer is definite and precise in our cases, that such rent collection in no way
creates any privity of estate or contract between mortgagee and lessee, in no way
cuts down or restricts the pre-existing rights of the mortgagee, gives no new rights
to the lessee and does not prevent repudiation of the lease and assertion of the
35
right of possession by the mortgagee or purchaser at the sale on the mortgage.
On this issue, there is respectable authority to show that the Pennsylvania view is
logically and practically incorrect and that such rent acceptance should at least
create a periodic tenancy by implication between mortgagee and lessee, subject of
course to termination of the mortgagee's interest by payment or tender by the mortgagor. 36 The reason given in the Pennsylvania cases for its view that no new lease
is created by implication is that to so hold would impede the collection of the mortgage and would be destructive to the security of mortgages. 8
I is clear that where the lease is made after the mortgage the mortgagee on
demand for payment of rent acquires no right to rents that have accrued prior to
such demand but only to rents accruing thereafter. This is true because the mortgagee has no right to possession, on which right his collection of rents is justified,
until he asserts the right to possession by demanding rent, 3' In this the law is
different where the lease is made prior to the mortgage where the assignment of
reversion theory applies.3 9
Receivership of a corporate lessee was held not to affect this right to demand
I3Curry case, supra, note 32.
341bid.

35See Brown v. Aiken, supra, note 29; Girard Trust Co. v. Dempsey, supra, note 28; Toub v.
18 D. & C. 220 (1932).
Tessler,
6

3 See, for example, Brown v, Storey, 1 Mann. & G. 117, 133 Eng. Rep. 270 (1840); Rogers

v. Humphreys, 4 Ad. & El. 299, 111 Eng. Rep. 799 (1835)

and Gartside v. Outley, 58 Ill. 210

(1871).
37Brown v. Aiken, supra, note 29; Girard Trust Co. v. Dempsey, supra, note 28.
SsMiners Savings Bank v. Thomas, supra, note 6; Real Estate-L.T. & T. Co. v. Homer B. & L.

Ass'n, supra, note 15; Shallcross v. Rankin, supra, note 20.
39Supra, notes 16 and 17 and text.
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rents by the mortgagee and on demand the receiver will hold such rent for the
mortgagee in preference to general creditors.4 0 In Pattan v. Citizens Mortgage
Co.4" receivers in possession of the corporate mortgagor's property collected rents
after default. The court held that since possession could not be taken or demanded
by the mortgagee because of the court possession, rents collected by the receiver
should be applied to the mortgage debt as if demand had been made for rents.
In Merten's Estate2 an executor petitioned for permission to collect rents
from mortgaged realty and the mortgagees objected, claiming that right for themselves. The court held that there was nothing in the general provisions of Section
14 of the Fiduciaries Act of 1917 which in any way affected or impaired the lien
of the mortgage given during lifetime or Lhat affected the rights of the mortgagees
thereunder. Since the right of the decedent was subject to the superior right of
the mortgagee to collect the rents, the executor's right was also so subject. Properly
then, the death of the mortgagor has no effect on the right of a mortgagee to collect rent.
In Miners Savings Bank v. Thomas'3 demand for rent was made on the lessee
after the service on him of an attachment execution by a judgment creditor of the
mortgagor. It was held that the attachment had the effect of an equitable assignment, gave the attaching creditor no greater rights than those of the judgment
debtor, and that all rents accruing after demand by the mortgagee were properly
payable to him, the attachment binding only the rent accruing prior to demand by
the mortgagee. Incidentally, this case, where the mortgage had a "rents, issues
and profits" clause, reaches the same conclusion as the condemned New Jersey
case 44 in which the clause was said to be mere surplusage.
A holder of a second mortgage would seem not to have legal title to the land,
could not be an assignee of the reversion nor have a right of possession based upon
legal title since such title has passed to the first mortgagee. But notwithstanding
this theoretical difficulty, second mortgagees are permitted to assert the same right
to collect rents as are first mortgagees. Such right is, of course, inferior to that of
the first mortgagee and can be exercised only when the first mortgagee is asserting
45
no right to collect rents.
The mortgagee who asserts a right to collect rent from lessees of the mortgagor thereby goes into what may be called "constructive" possession of the mort4

0Shallcross v. Rankin, supra, note 20.
4121 D. & C. 84 (1934).
See also to the same effect on bankruptcy of mortgagor, even

without a

"rents,

issues and profits" clause, Bindseil v. Liberty Trust Co., 248 Fed. 112 (1917).

42Supra, note 11.
3
4 Supra. note 6.
44

Supra. note 8 and text.

5

4 See Randal case, supra, note 7 and Shailcross case, supra, note 20.
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gaged property. But where the mortgagor merely directs the lessees to pay rent
to the mortgagee, the mortgagor retaining sole control over the property, this does
not constitute a taking of possession by the mortgagee with the duties of such. 4"
This being true, it is to be wondered why more mortgagees do not adopt this expedient in collecting rents.
DUTIES OF MORTGAGEES COLLECTING RENT

Where the mortgagee does assume such possession and control by collection of
rents, he becomes at least a "constructive" possessor of the property and takes upon
himself certain duties. The paramount duty is the duty to account to the mortgagor for the rents received by him as "quasi-trustee." It is not our purpose to
discuss generally this duty to account, his duty to pay taxes, etc. 47 His duty is said
to be that of a "provident owner" of the property so long as he retains possession
and control of the property through its rents and profits.4 8 Until he surrenders
possession and control to the mortgagor he is under a duty to use reasonable skill
and diligence in keeping the property productive by leases or otherwise and will
be chargeable with the income that such diligence would have produced. 49
An interesting question that seems untouched by any Pennsylvania case is
whether the mortgagee by virtue of being an assignee of the reversion in the one
instance or by virtue of asserting the right of possession and control in the other,
assumes the duties of the lessor to the lessee. Normally the assignee of the lessor's.
reversion, for example, assumes the duties of the lessor which run with the land,
such as the duty to furnish heat to a lessee of an apartment or the duty to insure
quiet enjoyment of the leased premises. 60 Do these duties automatically devolve
upon the mortgagee where the lease precedes his mortgage, he being an assignee
of the reversion? The conclusion seems inevitable that such should not be the
case until he asserts his rights as assignee by demand for rent and should cease as
soon as he relinquishes the rights of an assignee of the reversion. But while he is
asserting his right to the benefits of an assignee there would seem to be good reason
for imposing on him the reciprocal duties of an assignee. The same conclusion
seems just and equitable where the mortgage precedes the leas'e-he assumes the
duties of the lessor by asserting the right to collect the rent, and such duties cease
46Fidelity Title and Trust Co. v. Garrett, 327 Pa. 305, 194 Atl. 398 (1937).
47
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491 (1937).
48Commonwealth Trust Co. Case, 331 Pa. 569, 1 A. (2d) 662 (1938).
49Givens v. M'Calmont, 4 Watts 460 (1835) and Mellon v. Lemmon, 111 Pa. 56, 2 A.l. -,6

(1885).
60Sec 35 C.J. p. 1215. In Cargill v. Thompson, 59 N.W. 638 (Minn. 1894) where the
mortgagee was collecting rent, he was held not to be liable on a covenant of the lessor to furnish
water power. But it was there said that such mortgagee gets neither the benefits nor the burdens
of covenants. Pennsylvania has held that he does get the benefits, hence this case would be of no
value as authority in this state.
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when he surrenders possession and control to the lessor. But in this instance,
statements of our courts, made entirely without regard to the present problem,
might be used to refute this equitable conclusion. We refer to the recent Supreme
Court cases saying that collection of rent by the mortgagee "is not an attornment,"
"has no effect on the relations of the parties," creates "no privity of contract or
estate" between mortgagee and lessee. 5 ' We confidently predict, however, that
our courts will confine the force of these expressions to the precise situations with
reference to which they were expressed and will not extend their significance to
situations to which they are quite inappropriate and misleading.
One further possible duty of a mortgagee who assumes possession and control
of the realty by the collection of rents therefrom has been intimated by several recent cases. The lessor of realty owes certain duties in regard to the condition of
leased premises to persons using such realty. For example, the lessor of realty is
under a duty to persons using the sidewalks of leased property to use reasonable
care to see that such sidewalks are reasonably safe for use by pedestrians at the,
time the lessee enters into possession, notwithstanding that the duty of reasonable
52
Does the
care is placed usually on the one in actual occupancy and control.
mortgagee by asserting the right of possession by collection of rents assume such
duty to third persons? So long as he is getting the benefits of ownership by collection of rents, such duties should properly be imposed upon the mortgagee and
53
not upon the mortgagor. This is the intimation in recent cases although no fact
situation has as yet arisen that would impose liability upon the lessor and therefore
upon the mortgagee in possession by collection of rents.
A mortgagee of realty may collect rent on leases made by the mortgagor but
expert legal advice is required to distinguish between his rights where the lease
precedes the mortgage and where the mortgage precedes the lease and mortgagees
must ponder well whether the benefits thereof outweigh the liabilities that may be
incurred thereby.
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for example, Brown v. Aiken, fupra, note 29.
51See,
52
Levin v. Phila., 277 Pa. 560, 121 Ati. 331 (1923) and Binder v. Phila., 302 Pa. 378, 153 Atl.
725 (1931).
53See Dubin v. Phila., 34 D. & C. 61 (193s) and Sansotta v. Pittsburgh, 330 Pa. 199, 199 Atl.
164 (1938).

